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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently released an 
account of the agency's plans for a mission to Mars. Private organizations, like Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), have also expressed a goal to establish 
settlements on Mars within the next few decades. Yet the prospect of establishing settlements, 
that is, colonizing—as opposed to simply exploring—raises a number of issues. The focus of this 
study is on the emergence of rules and institutions on an extraterrestrial colony or planet like 
Mars; specifically, this study will explore the design of organizations and institutions of 
collective action, from the Constitutional Political Economy perspective.  
This study will set out to define and explore the impact of rule-following and cultural 
behavior on the emergence of new rules and institutions. This study will then compare the 
historical factors and framework used to develop rules and institutions in Colonial America with 
a prospective framework for rules and institutions on Mars. The examination of Colonial 
America serves to provide historical evidence for the creation of new rules and institutions based 
on the colonists’ previous experiences, rule-following and cultural behaviors. An individual’s 
experiences in the past, and one’s existing knowledge about communal behavior, will affect the 
behavior and the expectations about the behavior of others in the next community. As a result, 
the rules and institutions on Mars will be influenced by the backgrounds and experiences of 
people on Earth. 
Sociological and Economic Perspectives on Rule-Following Behavior 
In order to provide a cohesive definition of rule-following behavior, this study will 
explain and synthesize the sociological and economic literature on the topic. For sociologists, the 
definition of a rule or social norm is a prescript for how generally to act in certain types of 
situations. Sociologists start with the assumption that a person’s behavior is guided by social 
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norms and rules. Sociologists claim that observed rule-following behavior cannot, in general, be 
explained in terms of rational case-by-case choices (Vanberg, 1994). Diverging from a case-by-
case explanation, sociologists stress the importance of socialization—individuals come to abide 
by norms through the process in which positive and negative sanctions are imposed upon them 
by their social environment. This concept of socialization leads to the concept of internalization, 
according to which, a person’s willingness to abide by norms becomes independent of external 
sanctions and, instead, becomes part of one’s character. Although sociologists posit that the 
process of socialization leads to the process of internalization, sociologists also stress that rule-
following behavior is generally unconditional and unaffected by external incentives—this 
process is called institutionalization (Vanberg, 1994). Sociologist and economist Viktor Vanberg 
highlights the paradox of the sociologist’s interpretations of rule-following behavior that seems 
to be based on two incompatible conceptions—through the concept of sanctions, where people 
responds to incentives, and through the concept of institutionalization, where rule-following 
behavior is unresponsive to incentives. 
In contrast to sociologists, economists interpret human behavior as a sequence of singular 
choices, or choices on a case-by-case basis. The economic model of rational choice lies in the 
assumption that an individual chooses—among the potential alternatives—the choice that best 
serves his/her interests, given his/her preferences and his/her perception of the relevant 
situational constraints (Vanberg, 1994). This is in contrast to the sociological view that 
emphasizes the rule-following nature of social behavior, where rule-following behavior removes 
the individual action of making choices on a case-by-case basis. It is important to note that 
economists do not ignore the concept of social rules impacting a person’s behavior. In fact, there 
is an increasing interest in the economic analysis of rules and institutions accounting for 
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behavior. Economists, however, typically look at rules as choice-constraining factors. When the 
economic perspective is applied to a case-by-case model, rule-following behavior extends only 
so far as the particular situational incentive structure dictates a rule-conforming choice.  
A synthesis of both perspectives allows for genuine rule-following behavior to remain a 
real phenomenon, but also for this behavior to be defined and analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
There exists a fundamental tension between the economic notion of choice and that of rule-
following behavior, where rule-following behavior calls up the idea of pre-programmed 
behavior—the absence of choice. Often, the point of following a rule is not to calculate and 
evaluate each case individually. This type of evaluation and calculation is done by individuals 
considering alternative rules, deciding whether or not the adoption of a rule would be on balance 
rational. Philosopher and economist Friedrich Hayek bolsters this argument by asserting that 
man is in fact “as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one” (Hayek, 1978). 
Vanberg and others have stated that the tendency to adopt rules, to behave in a preprogrammed 
way rather than on the basis of case-by-case decisions, is inherent in human nature as it is, for 
that matter, to the nature of living organisms in general (Vanberg, 1994; Heiner, 1983).  
The Rationality of Rule-Following Behavior 
An understanding of the rationality of rule-following behavior allows for the creation of 
new institutions that accurately reflect the diverse rule-following behaviors and backgrounds of 
individuals from different cultures and societies. Vanberg highlights three basic ways in which 
following certain rules is rational and advantageous and may be translated into effective 
behavioral dispositions: (1) through natural selection and genetic evolution, (2) through habitual 
learning on the part of the individual, and (3) through the deliberate and conscious choice to 
adopt a rule (Vanberg, 1994). This study focuses on (2) learned rule-following behavior and (3) 
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the deliberate adoption of rules. In order for rule-following to be a rational practice, rules must 
generate two conditions—consequences that are sufficiently beneficial to the individual, or 
beneficial consequences because rule-following behavior is demonstrated frequently (Vanberg, 
1994). There are three reasons for why one or both of these conditions must be met, in order for 
a rational person to engage in rule-following behavior: decision making costs, the risk of 
mistakes, and the precommitment problem.  
 Decision making costs are reduced through rule-following behavior due to the principle 
that rules make other people’s behavior more predictable and offer relief from the permanent 
burden of having to choose among potential courses of actions. This fact is thoroughly explored 
in sociologist and anthropologist Arnold Gehlen’s anthropological theory of institutions. Gehlen 
states that institutions are a cultural analog to, and a substitute for, natural instincts (Berger & 
Kellner, 1965). He highlights that human behavior is much less pre-programmed by instincts 
than in animals, and human behavior is much more adaptable to varying environments. This 
plasticity of behavior causes uncertainty about other people’s behavior and imposes the burden 
of being permanently required to make decisions on how to act (Berger & Kellner, 1965). Rules 
and institutions are productive in that they release energies that would otherwise be preoccupied 
in having to make the right decision on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the rules and 
institutions concerning driving and road laws are a clear example of the reduction in decision 
making costs, making drivers more efficient and safe. If there were no rules and institutions 
governing drivers, then a driver would need to make countless case-by-case decisions every time 
she decides to pick a side of the road to drive on, crosses an intersection, merges lanes, etc. This 
would lead to slower, more dangerous roads and increases the burden on drivers to always make 
the right decisions that ensure their safety, as well as the safety of others. 
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The risk of making mistakes is also reduced through rule-following behavior, since the 
risk of errors is often sufficiently high on a case-by-case basis, due to such factors as a limited 
capacity of collecting and processing relevant information. As a result, rule-following behavior 
and the implementation of rules and institutions will be an overall superior strategy if the 
protection against erroneous decisions outweighs the disadvantage of missing out on other 
potentially preferred outcomes. Using the driving example, a singular driver has a limited 
capacity in collecting and processing the thoughts, destinations, and dispositions of the other 
drivers on the road. As a result, rule-following behavior is a rational and overall superior strategy 
when driving, since the protection against erroneous decisions or unsafe drivers outweighs the 
disadvantage of being unable to reach a destination faster, without following road laws. 
Finally, the precommitment problem covers all cases where the individual’s consistency 
of choices over time is the pre-condition for certain desirable outcomes to be realized in the 
future. These benefits are relevant when an individual as a rule behaves consistently in certain 
types of situations. For instance, when someone pulls up to an American drive-thru restaurant, 
the driver communicates his or her order to the restaurant attendant. After the food order is 
placed, the restaurant begins to prepare the food, prior to the driver paying for the food at the 
drive-thru window. This transaction, or precommitment, between the driver and the drive-thru 
restaurant ensures a quick, safe, and efficient interaction to take place.  
Rule-following behavior is a ubiquitous concept, as many societies find it rational to 
encourage rule-following behavior through laws and social practices. For example, most nations 
implement driving laws and impose consequences on rule-breakers. Decision-making costs, the 
risk of making mistakes, and the precommitment problem provide the reasons for the rationality 
of rule-following behavior in society and the need to design carefully-crafted institutions.  
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Behavioral Spillovers 
An exploration into the reasons for the development of behavioral heuristics shows that 
different needs or experiences often give rise to rules that are unique to a particular social group. 
In order to capture the impact that past experiences have on future decisions or behaviors, 
political scientist Jenna Bednar and her collaborators analyze the factors that affect behavior and 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. In Behavioral Spillovers and Cognitive Load in Multiple 
Games: An Experimental Study, Bednar and her collaborators examine the concepts of 
behavioral spillovers and cognitive load across various strategic contexts. People do not treat 
strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games 
(Bednar, et al., 2009). Through the use of multiple experimental games, Bednar and her 
collaborators sought to increase cognitive load—defined as the cognitive constraints that prevent 
an individual from playing multiple games optimally—in order to prevent agents from choosing 
efficient or equilibrium behaviors. This led to behavioral spillovers in which agents choose 
similar strategies in two separate games in the experiment.  
 The examination of behavioral spillovers highlights that context influences behavior—
different strategic situations lead to the development of heuristics that are unique to a particular 
social group. Three distinct behavioral outcomes emerged in Bednar’s experiment: selfishness, 
cooperation, and an alternation between cooperative and selfish actions. The results of the 
experiment show that if individuals play one game in an ensemble that encourages selfishness or 
cooperation, then they are more likely to exhibit the same behavior in the other games in that 
ensemble, even though they play the new game with a different player. As a result, the strategies 
chosen by individuals in one game depend on the other games that the individual plays, and that 
play is altered in predictable directions. Bednar’s experiment has an important implication for the 
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study of strategic games and social science research more generally: if behavior in one game 
depends on the other games an individual plays, then social science researchers must consider 
the full ensemble of games that an individual faces (Bednar, et al., 2009). Behavioral factors, 
such as cognitive load, lead someone to not play a game optimally, to not choose efficient or 
equilibrium behaviors or outcomes; however, these individuals develop heuristics to be applied 
across games. An individual’s experiences in the past, knowledge about common behavior, will 
“spillover” and influence the individual’s behavior when facing the same or similar choices in 
the future. Behavioral spillovers have a critical impact on the development of an individual’s 
rule-following behaviors. 
Cultural Behavior 
Cultural behavior refers to the rule-following behavior of an entire social group or 
society. Political scientists Jenna Bednar and Scott Page define cultural behavior as “individual 
and community level patterns that are context dependent and often suboptimal” (Bednar & Page, 
2007). Cultural behavior influences the performance of almost all human institutions. In the 
paper Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?, Bednar and Page capture the emergence of cultural 
behavior by studying individuals playing experimental games (Bednar & Page, 2007). This 
approach considers the ‘tool kit’ model of culture: individuals develop strategies that are tailored 
to specific situations, such as community level behavior and patterns that evolve for certain 
strategic environments (Bednar & Page, 2007). In order for cultural behavior to exist, it should 
generate both an identifiable set of behavioral traits within a single individual and support the 
principle that while individuals behave like others within their own community, they may behave 
differently from those in other communities. Five elements make up the general model for 
cultural behavior (Bednar & Page, 2007): 
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1. Intra-individual consistency: As an individual moves from task to task, he or 
she responds similarly. 
2. Inter-agent consistency: Individuals within the same community, encountering 
the same problems, will act like one another. 
3. Contextual effects: Individual from different communities may react differently 
to the same problem or phenomenon. 
4. Behavioral stickiness: Individuals may not immediately alter their behavior 
despite changes to their incentives. 
5. Suboptimal behavior: The strategies employed by individuals within a 
community may be suboptimal, where individuals could benefit in acting a 
different way.  
In addition, Bednar and Page explore a sixth phenomenon that has been identified in the 
empirical, experimental, and theoretical literature on cultures: frequency dependence—how often 
a game is played influences how likely individuals evolve optimal strategies (Bednar & Page, 
2007). These six elements of cultural behavior influence an individual or community’s 
backgrounds, experiences, and perception of rule-following behaviors. 
 Individuals from different communities exhibit unique cultural and rule-following 
behaviors, not just in their native communities or societies, but also in new societies. For 
example, in Bednar and Page’s experiment, individuals were often influenced by contextual 
effects—individuals from different communities reacted differently to the same problem. In 
addition, individuals’ mental states and cognitive subroutines appeared to be similar across 
games, invoking the same cognitive processes in distinct contexts. The combined effect of both 
intra-individual and inter-agent consistency creates a community of individuals who act 
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consistently and similarly within a society, but differently when compared to another society 
(Bednar & Page, 2007). These behaviors would not have emerged, had the optimal behavior 
been the same for all individuals in every game (in fact, if that were true, cultural behavior would 
not emerge and incentives would dominate). When purposeful, incentive-sensitive agents 
confront multiple strategic situations rather than just one, and when cognitive effort is costly, 
Bednar and Page find that culturally distinct behavior is likely and in many cases unavoidable 
(Bednar & Page, 2007). Rational individuals balance a strategy’s cognitive costs and 
performance. As a result, rational individuals choose to “act culturally.” This has significant 
implications for the development of future societies, as explored later in this study. 
Cultural behavior influences prevalent social concepts that have a significant impact on 
many societies, such as the concept of reciprocity. Reciprocity is defined as the process of 
exchanging objects and action with others for mutual benefit (Vanberg, 1994). Reciprocity can 
be influenced by both rules and institutions (example: contracts) and through informal 
agreements among individuals. It is often in the interest of individuals to exhibit rule-following 
behavior and be regarded as “trustworthy” in society. Reciprocity is abundant in the daily social 
interactions between individuals and it often is the product of rule-following behavior. This study 
will return to the concept of reciprocity and examine its consequences on society in the next 
section. 
The existence of distinct rule-following and cultural behaviors has significant 
implications on societies with a diverse population; individuals and communities within these 
diverse societies will have different experiences and perceptions about behavior from their 
former communities. One implication of these experiments is that if the order of the interactions 
can be modified, behavior will change. It has been suggested that certain societies that have more 
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opportunities for cooperative behavior in their daily lives, such as through collective hunting or 
informal markets, tend to cooperate more in laboratory experiments (Bednar & Page, 2007). 
Such findings imply that carefully-crafted institutions may facilitate the increase of opportunities 
for cooperative behavior. Nevertheless, Bednar and Page found that behavioral changes were 
unlikely if some newly proposed behavioral heuristics conflicted with existing patterns of 
behavior. For example, in a society were self-interested behavior happened frequently, the switch 
to cooperation may not occur until the benefits of cooperation are sufficiently pronounced to 
determine a change in the culture. 
Bednar and Page note that their framework for cultural behavior has implications for the 
historical development of institutions. A set of existing institutions can influence the success of a 
society (Boeker, 1989; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Greif, 1994; Stinchcombe, 1965). Exploring 
the historical development of cultural behavior across societies is a difficult task, since it is 
difficult to collect information on different societies’ norms and conventions over time. Although 
the application of these models to historical cases could prove to be difficult, the potential payoff 
to researchers (institutional designers, and lawmakers) may be significant. To that end, the 
present paper will now analyze the case of rules and institutions in Colonial America and 
develop a prospective framework for rules and institutions on Mars.  
Rules and Behavior in Colonial America 
 It can be argued that rules and institutions in Colonial America were influenced by the 
backgrounds and previous experiences of the European colonists. Several factors distinguish 
Colonial America from other colonial enterprises in history. In fact, throughout history the 
dominant reason for colonization was generally an economic one: colonization was motivated by 
the extraction of resources and labor for economic gain, as these resources were sent back to the 
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colonial power. Instead, Colonial America was unique in that although many settlers sought 
economic gain, many also arrived in America due to various social and religious pressures back 
in their native countries, often escaping poverty, war, or religious prosecution (Hoffer, 1998). 
British, Dutch, Spanish, and French settlers made up the majority of the colonial population. 
These European settlers also coexisted with Native Americans for a period of time, before the 
settlers forcefully removed much of the Native American population out of their native lands. 
The diversity of the settlers made up a dynamic community featuring some shared cultural values 
and experiences prior to colonization. Nevertheless, many geographically separated communities 
in Colonial America had very distinct cultural and legal practices. Also, colonists’ informal 
behaviors and practices often reflected various environmental and situational factors, such as the 
presence of the Native American population or the previous religious oppression they 
experienced in Europe. 
 The diversity of the cultural and social backgrounds of the colonists had a critical impact 
on the laws that formed in Colonial America. English customs and common law had the most 
influence on colonial life (Hoffer, 1998). But still, early colonists had different notions of rules 
and institutions, as compared to England: historian Peter Hoffer, in his book Law and People in 
Colonial America, stated that (for colonists) “their repression in England induced them to rethink 
the operation of law and gave impetus to what would become a far more thoroughgoing revision 
of law and courts than was ever attempted” (Hoffer, 1998). The transmission of English Law to 
North America was a failure of vast proportions (Hoffer, 1998). Due to geographic separation, 
varying backgrounds of the colonists, and different establishment histories and economies, 
distinctive legal cultures emerged in the northern and southern colonies.  
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Rather than implementing the same strict legal structures that were prevalent in different 
parts of Europe, colonists allowed for the development of flexible legal institutions that reflected 
and somewhat combined their previous experiences. The variety of specialized courts in Colonial 
America demonstrated that the various colonies and communities had distinct origins, cultural 
behavior, and legal doctrines. For example, some southern colonies with slave populations had 
unique freeholder courts that ruled on laws governing slave trade and punished lawbreakers, 
including slaves (Hoffer, 1998). Due to the societal norms of these southern colonies, there was a 
need for specialized courts that could be relied upon when disputes often arose concerning slaves 
(Hoffer, 1998). On the other hand, there existed specialized courts in the northern colonies, such 
as Rhode Island, which enforced and advocated for loyalty towards England (Hoffer, 1998). 
Unlike most colonists, many settlers in Rhode Island had a strong interest in maintaining their 
cultural and political ties with Britain. These settlers had English aristocratic ties and parted from 
their English homeland amicably (Hoffer, 1998). When relatively isolated from their native 
countries, the colonists developed legal systems that suited their needs and dispensed English 
formalities. 
Due to the initial lack of established rules, laws, and institutions, early colonists often 
relied on the concept of reciprocity: indeed, in Colonial America, personal value and reputation 
were primarily built through the practice of reciprocity. Reputation and the concept of dignity 
were critical to life in Colonial America, as colonists often relied on personal and self-worth to 
engage in transactions with others. In fact, reciprocity and reputation allowed for individuals to 
obtain credit and engage in economic and social transactions with fellow colonists, prior to the 
existence of formal rules and institutions (Hoffer, 1998). Unlike England and many European 
countries, personal value in America was usually not derived from heredity or military status. 
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Now, it should be noted that there was a drastic increase in litigation and lawsuits in the 
mid-1700s, leading to the formation of new formal rules and institutions in Colonial America. In 
effect, prior to the mid-1700s, most interpersonal transactions took place without the use of 
formal institutions (simply relying on reputation and reciprocity); however, from the mid-1700s 
and onwards, many transactions and disputes were settled in formal courts. Several factors 
contributed to this explosion of litigation. Both the colonial population and the English colonial 
control rapidly expanded during this period: due to the changes in demographics and British 
colonial pressures on formal institutions, the social boundaries on personal conduct were tested 
(Hoffer, 1998). In other words, many colonists wanted a society with formal rules and 
institutions that were different from the oppressive European governments they had left behind.  
Cultural variance caused significant issues in these diverse communities: informal rules 
needed to be made formal so as to ensure a reduction in decision making costs and the risk of 
making mistakes. In order to ensure consistency of social practices, colonists utilized civil 
litigation within their communities. Civil litigation enabled an entire colonial community to 
explore and test the boundaries of personal conduct (Hoffer, 1998). During this period in colonial 
history, many of these boundaries became indistinct and litigation increased as a result; but, this 
rise in lawsuits only lasted until the end of the 18th century. Hoffer states, “as the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior were gradually redrawn, the gross number of disputes rose in proportion to 
the rise in population, but the rate at which disputes became lawsuits leveled off” (Hoffer, 1998). 
A rise in lawsuits and specialized courts, allowed for the creation of formal rules and institutions, 
which was often influenced by the combination of the colonists’ previous experiences. 
In addition to the diversity of the immigrant population in Colonial America, there 
existed many interactions between the Native American population and European settlers; each 
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group exhibited different cultural behaviors, which influenced the expectations of each about the 
behavior of others. European settlers and Native Americans had differences in the rules and 
practices governing social life; however, it was necessary for both parties to develop a common 
set of laws and institutions, which ensured that transactions could take place between both 
parties. Note that European law was often written, coercive, and individualized; Native 
American law was typically oral, based on consent, oaths and shaming, and often incorporated 
collective responsibility (Hoffer, 1998). In this connection, it should be noted that in early 
colonial history, some colonists rejected the idea of forming rules and institutions with Native 
Americans, which led to significantly more conflict and misunderstanding between both parties 
(Hoffer, 1998).  
Thus, due to the rise in various disagreements and violence, European colonists began to 
utilize gift-based diplomacy, where gifts were used as a lubricant of law. In addition, European 
settlers also began to recognize the Native Americans’ notion of group responsibility (Hoffer, 
1998). Accounting for the distinct cultural behaviors of European colonists and Native 
Americans, laws and institutions were created to allow for a formal medium of transactions and 
dispute settlement. These formal institutions were sometimes successful in combining the 
interests of both parties, such as punishment for witches (both Native Americans and European 
settlers were afraid of witches) (Hoffer, 1998). But more generally, the long-standing differences 
in cultural behaviors between Native Americans and European settlers did not permit successful 
mitigation of misunderstandings. For example, Native Americans viewed private property 
differently than the Europeans settlers—Native Americans did not claim allodial land rights as 
individuals; the land itself was communal and the fruits of the land were shared (Hoffer, 1998). 
This understanding and behavior conflicted with the established European understanding, 
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behaviors, and laws concerning private property. Despite the effort to create rules and 
institutions that ensured peaceful interactions and transactions between European colonists and 
Native Americans, some differences in social practices were unable to be reconciled through 
rules and institutions (as often developed and imposed by European colonists). As a result, rules 
and institutions between European colonists and Native Americans were largely unsuccessful 
and led to the forced removal and destruction of Native American communities. 
In brief, the diverse backgrounds of the colonists had a significant influence on the rules 
and institutions that formed in Colonial America. Factors that influenced the laws in Colonial 
America include the colonists’ reasons for leaving their European homeland (religious 
oppression, economic opportunity), an explosion of litigation, Native American relations, among 
many others. In 1789, the colonies adopted the United States Constitution, which reflected the 
colonists’ previous experiences in Europe, and their new experiences in their diverse American 
communities. For example, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes 
the freedom of religion—a rule that was created in response to the religious oppression that 
many colonists previously experienced in their native European communities. The history and 
development of American rules and institutions was not without many failures—these laws often 
brought about conflict between various communities throughout history, such as the 
displacement of Native Americans. Although the complexity of the colonists’ cultural behavior 
cannot be fully captured by studying early rules and institutions in Colonial America, this 
exploration highlights the impact that past experiences have on the creation of new rules and 
institutions in a new society or colony. 
Martian Colonization 
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 This study will now explore the case of a hypothetical Martian settlement, where humans 
live in a self-sustaining colony, away from their social communities on Earth. The individuals in 
the Martian colony would have different backgrounds and expectations, as determined by their 
previous communities on Earth. When compared to the history of Colonial America, Martian 
colonization would have a different set of cultural and social constraints leading to the creation 
of new rules and institutions specific to a Martian society. Nevertheless, there exist many 
similarities between Colonial America and Martian colonization. Colonial America was an 
“exercise of caution” by the colonists, in creating rules and institutions that were different from 
the European societies they had left behind; the United States Constitution was a manifestation 
of these new rules and institutions. As a new colonial exercise in an uninhabited planet, Martian 
colonization would also require a measure of caution, concerning both the physical environment 
and the rules and institutions governing a diverse society over 200 million miles away from 
Earth.  
 The rules and institutions on Mars will be influenced by the diverse cultural behaviors of 
people on Earth. As explored earlier in this study, both behavioral spillovers and culture 
influence an individual’s rule-following behavior in a new community. Societies have developed 
unique cultural behaviors on Earth, which would later influence an individual’s perception about 
“normal” behavior in a new colony like Mars. For example, if reciprocity were a widespread 
feature in an individual’s society on Earth, this individual may subsequently expect reciprocal 
behavior from other individuals in a Martian community. In addition, if many Martian colonists 
had a negative experience with certain rules and institutions on Earth—such as the religious 
oppression from which many European colonists escaped from in Colonial America—these 
Martian colonists would venture to create laws on Mars that prevent their previous negative 
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experiences. Rather than repeating the mistakes of previous colonial enterprises, often leading to 
conflict among people with diverse backgrounds (such as in Colonial America) Martian 
“institutional designers” must study the norms and conventions of the societies on Earth, in order 
to create rules and institutions suited for a diverse Martian colony.  
The likelihood of cultural conflict and coordination failures is often underestimated, 
leading to severe consequences when concerning the safety or success of a society. Through the 
creation of rules and institutions that reflect a diversity of cultures, many of these conflicts could 
be avoided. Using Bednar’s findings (explored earlier in the study), rules and institutions that 
promote more opportunities for cooperative behavior may have a positive effect on a diverse 
community. For example, the rules and institutions on Mars could be designed to emphasize 
informal markets, collective activity, and any other means to facilitate an increase in 
opportunities for cooperative behavior. Cooperative behavior serves as the oil in the wheels of 
society. The formation of cooperative rules and institutions would require a detailed examination 
of the existing rule-following and cultural behaviors of the colonists’ native societies on Earth, 
leading to the creation of rules and institutions that reflect these behaviors.  
 To conclude, the concepts of rule-following behavior, behavioral spillovers and cultural 
behavior apply to any instance of community/nation-building, whether or not the colonization is 
taking place on planet Earth or Mars. Martian colonization would be similar to Colonial 
America, due to the principle that rules and institutions on a new colony will be influenced by 
the backgrounds of the colonists’ native societies. However, the Martian civilization would 
perhaps be different when compared to any previous colony, due to our improved knowledge of 
the functioning of both formal and informal institutions. The colonization of Mars could be a 
	 	 Sirivolu	18	
significant milestone for humanity; such a milestone merits the application of what humanity has 
learned throughout history about rules, institutions, and rule-following behavior. 
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